A new Solange judgment from Germany: or nothing to worry about? by Nowag, Julian
  Navigation 
JULIAN NOWAG —  22 March, 2016 Print  4    
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A new Solange judgment 
from Germany – or 
nothing to worry about?
In its recent decision (in German, press release in English) 
on Mr R the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG or the Court) 
rejected an extradition request pursuant to the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW). The Court invalidated a decision of 
the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf to extradite Mr R to 
Italy under the EAW because the decision would violate 
human dignity as protected by Art 1(1) of the German 
Constitution.
The background 

In 1992, a court in Florence had sentenced Mr R, a US 
citizen, to 30 years of imprisonment for cocaine smuggling 
and mafia membership. These proceedings took place in 
absentia. Not only was Mr R not present at the proceedings 
but he also claimed not to have been aware of them.
In 2014, Mr R was arrested in Germany based on an EAW 
issued by Italy. The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf 
found that Mr R could be extradited to Italy. Against this 
decision Mr R lodged a constitutional complaint to the 
BVerfG.
The legal framework is provided by Art 4(a)(1)(c)(d) of the 
Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant (which 
was an amendment of Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA) and Sec 83(3) of the Act on International 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters which implements the 
framework decision.
The framework decision allows rejecting extradition 
requests where the defendant was not present at the trial if 
there is no ‘right to a retrial, or an appeal, in which the 
person has the right to participate and which allows the 
merits of the case, including fresh evidence, to be re-
examined.’ The implementing German law made use of this 
option. Under German law extradition is only allowed where 
a new judicial procedure takes place which guarantees the 
full examination (including new facts) of the accusation and 
the accused is present.
In the extradition proceedings concerning Mr R there were 
doubts as to whether new facts could be presented at 
judicial proceedings in Italy. R had argued that the Italian 
criminal procedure code would not guarantee that new 
evidence could be presented. The Düsseldorf court rejected 
this argument and decided to extradite Mr R after a 
response from the Italian prosecutor’s office. It found that 
‘taking into account new evidence was at least not 
impossible’ under the relevant Italian criminal procedure.
The Decision of the BVerfG
The BVerfG held that this decision violated the German 
Constitution. The Court rather briefly examined the 
question of admissibility (para 34) and found that the matter 
was admissible as a violation of human dignity was alleged 
and such a claim would form part of the constitutional 
identity review.
In terms of substance, the judgment begins by highlighting 
the limits the German Constitution places on primacy of EU 
law namely constitutional identity (para 37-50). The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht then explains that the 
constitutional identity would encompass in particular the 
unamendable, constitutional guarantees/eternity clause 
(Ewigkeitsklausel, Article 79(3) and 23(1) first sentence of the 
constitution) including the guarantee of human dignity. 
Human dignity would include the principle of individual fault 
(Schuldprinzip).
In the second part of the judgment the Court stresses how 
the decision of the Düsseldorf court violates human dignity 
as part of the eternity clause (para 51-124). In this section the 
Court explains that the principle of individual fault would set 
minimum requirements which need to be observed in 
extraction proceedings (para 52-75). Moreover, the BVerfG 
declares that while the EAW would usually take precedence 
over German law this would not mean that the national 
courts would not be required to comply with the 
requirements of human dignity (para 76-109). In fact, mutual 
trust as enshrined in the EAW would be limited by human 
dignity as protected by the German Constitution (para 83).
After this part the Court (surprisingly) finds that such a 
limitation of primacy would not be needed. The EAW as well 
as the implementing law on mutual assistance in 
translational criminal matters’ would sufficiently protect 
human dignity (para 84).
Yet, it nonetheless finds that the Düsseldorf court violated 
the human dignity of Mr R as protected by the German 
Constitution by not sufficiently examining whether Mr R 
would be able to present new evidence in a trial in Italy. 
(109-123).
In its final part the judgment very briefly explains that a 
reference to the Court of Justice (CJ) would not have been 
necessary due to the acte claire doctrine. The case law 
would be clear and EU law would not prevent the Düsseldorf 
court from investigating whether Mr R could or could not 
present new evidence in a trial in Italy (para 125).
Comment
The decision of the constitutional court has already created 
strong reactions by commentators. Some claim that it would 
create a Solange III situation. Other have described it as 
pushing the button on the constitutional identity bomb and 
a bad decision during a bad time.
In principle, the decision in Mr R seems to follow the 
constitutional identity logic, developed in the BVerfG’ Lisbon 
judgment. The Court finds that human dignity would form 
part of its constitutional identity review. And it was this logic 
that informed the finding that the extradition order was 
unconstitutional. However, I would possibly not describe the 
decision as pushing the constitutional identity bomb button. 
In particular given that the Court finds that the same 
protection of human dignity would be afforded by the EAW. 
Thus, rejecting the extraction could have similarly been 
based on EU law without resorting to human dignity as 
protected by the German Constitution.
However, basing this decision on constitutional indemnity 
and human dignity is troubling for another reason. The 
question that can be raised is whether the constitutional 
identity review door has been opened too far. If the principle 
of individual guilt is found to form part of human dignity and 
every EU act can be examined against it, what about other 
fundamental rights? It could easily be argued that a vast 
number (if not all) of fundamental rights are based on human 
dignity. With this decision the BVerfG has created a new 
avenue to challenge EU acts before the Court. The decision 
may undo the admissibility hurdle of the Banana market 
decision and the Court may be faced with numerous 
challenges in the future. Clarification in this regard will be 
dearly needed.
In terms of the Solange claim, two things can be observed. 
First, the Court based the review on constitutional identity. 
Second, the word ‘solange’ is not present in the judgment. In 
fact, because the Court based the judgment on the 
constitutional identity review the case is not really an ‘as 
long as’ situation. Given that the constitutional identity 
review will always be exercised, the case rather reaffirms the 
review power of the BVerfG. The judgment makes clear that 
the constitutional identity review will always be performed 
by the BVerfG: the BVerfG chose a reasoning based on 
constitutional identity although it held that the EAW would 
already sufficiently protect human dignity and thus the same 
result could have been reached under EU law. The BVerfG 
made clear that even though the EAW would usually take 
precedence over German law, German courts would still 
have to comply with human dignity as protected by the 
German Constitution. Hence, if one would like to formulate a 
solange message from this judgment it would rather be: As 
long as this German constitution exists, the BVerfG will 
perform this kind of review.
A couple of further points should be highlighted. First, some 
of the most interesting parts have been dealt with rather 
briefly, ie in one paragraph. This is true for the questions of 
admissibility and acte claire.
As already pointed out, the admissibility point might come 
back to haunt the BVerfG in future decisions as every 
applicant from now on will try to frame its application in 
terms of human dignity.
The other question is acte claire. According to acte claire 
(established by the CJ in Da Costa and CILFIT) there is no 
requirement to ask for a preliminary reference if the 
question of EU law is already clear. Whether the case of Mr R 
was really an act clear can be doubted. First, Melloni to 
which the BVerfG refers seems to relate mainly to the clash 
between constitutional law and the EAW. The question in 
this proceeding was the level of security under the EAW with 
regard to criminal procedures in another EU country. 
Melloni seems not to address this issue. While it may be 
possible to see this issue as one of national procedural 
autonomy (possibly supported by the human dignity 
argument), the current European case law or legislation is 
not clear on this matter. Thus, a preliminary reference may 
very well have been due. Yet, one may come to a different 
conclusion when taking into account the recent reshaping of 
the acte claire doctrine. Yet, asking the question in particular 
when taking into account the human dignity and 
constitutional identity aspect (while possibly not required) 
would have been a sign of dialog with the CJ.
Moreover, such a reference would prevent any problems 
that may arise if the Düsseldorf court decided to put such a 
question to CJ as a preliminary reference as some have 
suggested (see comments here).
Conclusion: While not Solange III, other issues are raised
The outcome of the case may seem clear even without an in-
depth investigation of EU and German constitutional law: it 
was not enough for the Düsseldorf court to simply leave Mr 
R with the statement that ‘taking into account new evidence 
was at least not impossible.’ In the case of doubts about 
Italian criminal procedure a more thorough investigation 
was needed.
From a human rights perspective the case seems to be a 
clear win. Any defendant in Germany now has the chance to 
plead EU fundamental rights as well as human dignity as part 
of Germany’s constitutional identity where EU law is applied. 
In this way the court added another layer of protection. 
Moreover, the BVerfG seems to have brought up a painful 
subject once more: Italian criminal proceedings in absentia.
Yet, the case seems to be a bad case – a bad case in the 
sense that the outcome was clear but the reasoning might 
create further problems down the line. The case establishes 
two standards of human dignity protection, the EU standard 
and the German standard. What will happen if the two 
standards conflict? (Well at least the answer of the BVerfG 
seems clear) What happens if the Düsseldorf court would 
now decide to make a reference to the CJ? Will every 
applicant to the BVerfG now argue that there has been a 
breach of human dignity? Where does human dignity stop 
and general fundamental rights protection begin if 
fundamental rights are derived from human dignity?
A final thought: If the BVerfG would approve the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the decision 
concerning Mr R may be used to retrospectively reaffirm the 
review powers of the BVerfG (for the relevant CJ decision in 
Gauweiler and a comment see here). In anticipation of 
approving the OMT programme the Court had to make a 
point and show that its review powers are alive and well.
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ILIYA TSIKALOV
31 March, 2016 at 14:27 — Reply
Great analysis. It is not the first time though the BVerfG 
impliedly shows a stronger preference for the German 
Consitution when rights stemming from it need to be 
balanced against EU law. Reference for a premilinary 
ruling to the CJ would have been interesting as well.
The BVerfG affirms once more its willingness for a review 
and ability for, one may say, quite a controversial 
reasoning.
JULIAN NOWAG
18 November, 2016 at 20:18 — Reply
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first of all sorry for the late reply, I did not get any 
notification of your comment and only now by accident 
saw it. 
Thanks for your comment. This is indeed very true and 
important, but the word limits of a blog posts sometimes 
means that you need to limit what you can examine. I 
have done a more substantive piece, which can be found 
here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2840473 and a version of the paper has now 
also been published in the latest CMLRev…
ILIYA TSIKALOV
23 November, 2016 at 13:03 — Reply
Dear Julian,
I undestand that in these comments one should limit his 
elaborations, even though sometimes it is quite difficult 
bearing in mind such interesting cases.
Just read the more substantive piece and it is a great 
analysis.
Certainly a clash between CJ and BVerfG.
JULIAN NOWAG
23 November, 2016 at 22:23 — Reply
Thank you Iliya! 
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